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Opinion piece
Learning to understand
others’ actions
Despite nearly two decades of research on mirror
neurons, there is still much debate about what
they do. The most enduring hypothesis is that
they enable ‘action understanding’. However,
recent critical reviews have failed to ﬁnd compel-
ling evidence in favour of this view. Instead, these
authors argue that mirror neurons are produced
by associative learning and therefore that they
cannot contribute to action understanding. The
present opinion piece suggests that this argument
is ﬂawed. We argue that mirror neurons may
both develop through associative learning and
contribute to inferences about the actions of
others.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mirror neurons, which have been discovered in the
premotor area F5 [1] and inferior parietal lobule,
area PF [2] of macaque monkeys, discharge not only
when the monkey executes an action of a certain type
(e.g. precision grip), but also when it observes the
experimenter performing the same action. A number
of neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that
a similar system also exists in humans (e.g. [3]).
A matter of much debate is whether activity in the
so-called ‘mirror neuron system’ (MNS) reﬂects
neural processes engaged in ‘action understanding’,
that is, inferences about the goals and intentions driv-
ing an observed action. It has been suggested that
mirror neurons are simply the result of learned sensori-
motor associations, as proposed in the associative
sequence learning (ASL) model [4,5], and that this
ontogeny is inconsistent with a role in understanding
the actions of others [6,7]. In contrast, we argue that
mirror neurons may develop through associative
learning and subsequently contribute to action
understanding.
2. ASL MODEL
The ASL model [4,5] proposes that the mirror pro-
perties of the MNS emerge through sensorimotor
associative learning. Under this hypothesis, we are
not born with an MNS. Rather, experience in which
observation of an action is correlated with its execution
establishes excitatory links between sensory and motor
representations of the same action. We have abundant
experience of matching relationships between observed
and executed actions during our lives [8]. Following
such experience, observation of an action is
sufﬁcient to activate its motor representation. There-
fore, representations that were originally motor
become ‘mirror’ (activated when observing and
executing the same action, ﬁgure 1).
If the ASL model is correct, mirror neurons do not
have an ‘adaptive function’, they did not evolve ‘for’
action understanding or to meet the demands of any
other cognitive task [5]. However, as a by-product of
associative learning, mirror neurons could still be
recruited in the course of development to play some
part in a variety of cognitive tasks. Therefore, accord-
ing to the ASL model, they could be useful without
being essential, and without their utility explaining
their origins. Speciﬁcally, mirror neurons could play
a part in action understanding even if this functional
role was not favoured by natural selection in the
course of phylogenetic evolution.
So why has the ASL hypothesis been interpreted as
evidence against a functional role of mirror neurons in
action understanding? Hickok [6] argued that some of
the evidence that has been published in support of
ASL is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
MNS is involved in action understanding. The studies
in question require participants to observe actions
while systematically executing non-matching actions,
and subsequently record indices of MNS functioning.
The rationale for these experiments assumes that, if
the MNS develops through associative learning, then
experiences that differ from those typically encoun-
tered during life should reconﬁgure the MNS and
change the way it operates. Consistent with this predic-
tion, it has been found that training in which
participants are required to perform index ﬁnger
actions when they see little ﬁnger actions, and vice
versa, results in activation of primary motor cortical
representations of the index ﬁnger when passively
observing little ﬁnger actions, and activation of rep-
resentations of the little ﬁnger when observing index
ﬁnger actions [9,10]. Catmur et al.[ 11] demonstrated
that such training effects are likely to be mediated by
cortical circuits that overlap with areas of the MNS.
They required one group of participants to lift their
hand when they saw a hand lift, and to lift their foot
when they saw a foot lift (matching group). Another
group was required to lift their hand when they saw a
foot lift, and to lift their foot when they saw a hand
lift (non-matching group). Following such training,
voxels in premotor and inferior parietal cortices that
responded more when observing hand than foot
actions in the matching group responded more to
foot than hand actions in the non-matching group.
This ﬁnding suggests that, following non-matching
training, observation of hand actions activates motor
representations of foot actions. Similar ‘counter-
mirror’ training effects have also been observed in
behavioural paradigms (e.g. [12,13], see also [14,15]
for ‘logically related’ activations that may have
been generated through naturally occurring non-
matching experience).
Hickok [6] argued that these studies provide evi-
dence that mirror neurons cannot underlie action
understanding. Embracing the idea that counter-
mirror training reconﬁgures the MNS—making it
responsive to the sight of one action and the execution
of a different action—he reasoned that, if the
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ﬁguration should have an impact on action
understanding. However, he considered that partici-
pants who showed counter-mirror activation (e.g.
stronger activation of the index ﬁnger muscle during
observation of little than of index ﬁnger movement)
‘presumably did not mistake the perception of index
ﬁnger movement for little ﬁnger movement and vice
versa’ ([6], p.1236). The key word here is ‘presum-
ably’. Neither the focal study by Catmur et al.[ 9], nor
any other study, has examined the effects of counter-
mirror training on indices of action understanding.
3. PREDICTIVE CODING AND ACTION
UNDERSTANDING
The aim of the predictive coding (PC) account [16,17]
was to answer the question ‘if mirror neurons enable
the observer to infer the intention of an observed
action, how might they do this’? In many accounts of
the MNS, it is assumed that mirror neurons are
driven by the sensory data and that when the mirror
neurons discharge, the action is ‘understood’. How-
ever, within this scheme mirror neurons could only
enable action understanding if there was a one-to-
one mapping between the sensory stimulus and the
intention of the action. This is not the case. If you
see someone in the street raise their hand, they could
be hailing a taxi or swatting a wasp. The context
must establish which intention is more likely to drive
an action. Consistent with the PC account, the empiri-
cal evidence does not support the view that mirror
neurons are driven solely by sensory data from focal
action stimuli. For example, Umilta et al.[ 18] found
that neurons in F5, which ﬁre both when the monkey
executes and observes grasping actions, also ﬁred
when the monkey observed the experimenter’s grasp-
ing action disappear behind a screen. That is, the
premotor neurons represented a grasping action in its
entirety, but where the grasping phase was not actually
seen. Therefore, mirror neurons could not be driven
entirely by the focal stimulus input. The PC account
provides a framework that resolves these issues.
The essence of the PC account is that, when we
observe someone else executing an action, we use our
own motor system to generate a model of how we
would perform that action to understand it [19,20].
PC enables inference of the intentions of an observed
action by assuming that the actions are represented at
several different levels [21] and that these levels are
organized hierarchically such that the description of
one level will act as a prior constraint on sub-ordinate
levels. These levels include: (i) the intention level that
deﬁnes the long-term desired outcome of an action, (ii)
the goal level that describes intermediate outcomes
that are necessary to achieve the long-term intention,
(iii) the kinematic level that describes, for example,
the shape of the hand and the movement of the arm
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Figure 1. Associative sequence learning. Before learning, sensory neurons (S1,S 2 and Sn) which are responsive to different
high-level visual properties of an observed action are weakly and unsystematically connected (dashed arrows) to some
motor neurons (M1,M 2 and Mn), which discharge during the execution of actions. The kind of learning that produces
mirror neurons occurs when there is correlated (i.e. contiguous and contingent) activation of sensory and motor neurons
that are each responsive to similar actions.
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intentions or goals of an observed action, the observer
must be able to represent the observed movement at
either the goal level or the intention level,
having access only to a visual representation of the
kinematic level.
PC proposes that contextual cues generate a prior
expectation about the intention of the person we are
observing. In the above example of the hand-raising
action, these cues could be the presence of a taxi or
wasp, or a facial expression. On the basis of these
intentions, we can generate a prior expectation of the
person’s intermediate goals. Given their intermediate
goals, we can predict the perceptual kinematics. Back-
ward connections convey the prediction to the lower
level where it is compared with the representation at
this sub-ordinate level to produce a prediction error.
This prediction error is then sent back to the higher
level, via forward connections, to update the
representation at this level (ﬁgure 2). By minimizing
the prediction error at all the levels of action
representation, the most likely cause of the action, at
both the intention and the intermediate goal
level, will be inferred. Thus, the PC process uses
information, supplied by the MNS, about which
goals are most likely, given a certain intention, and
which kinematics are most likely, given a certain
goal, to test hypotheses about the observed actors’
intentions.
The assumptions of the PC model are consistent
with those of ASL. If both models are correct,
the MNS develops through associative learning and
subsequently supports inferences about the goals
and intentions driving others’ actions. Therefore, it
remains an open and important empirical question
whether any intervention that systematically changes
the MNS has correlated effects on action
understanding.
4. CONCLUSION
PC and ASL accounts of the MNS address different
questions and offer compatible answers. The PC
account considers the requirements that are necess-
ary to enable goal or intention inference during
action observation. It assumes that the sensorimotor
connection strengths have been learned, but does not
propose a mechanism by which these are learned.
ASL provides an associative mechanism for such
learning. Although ASL does not provide a mechan-
istic account of how such learning could enable
action understanding, it allows for the possibility
that the MNS, once acquired, could support such
functions. In other words, the MNS could enable
inferences about the intentions of others, even if this
function is not an evolutionary adaptation. Therefore,
if both the PC and ASL hypotheses are correct, we
learn, via the principles speciﬁed in associative learn-
ing theory, to predict others’ intentions using our own
motor systems.
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